July 17, 2019 – Tsadra Conferences

Zhang ston Bsod nams grags pa’s Defense of Dol po pa’s Clear-Cut Distinction between Buddha Nature and the Ground Consciousness

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:36:33 +0000

Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan’s (1292-1361) doctrinal position is well known for its clear-cut distinction between an ultimate, unconditioned buddha-nature, which is identical with the ultimate and buddhahood, and the conditioned ground consciousness (ālayavijñāna), including all saṃsāric states of mind emerging from it. This strict distinction excludes from the ultimate anything dependently arisen. Dol po pa’s disciple Zhang ston Bsod nams grags pa (1292-1370) defends his master’s view by addressing opposing statements in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra and the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra that equate buddha-nature with the ground consciousness. Zhang ston’s discussion constitutes the major part of the introduction to his commentary on the Tathāgatagarbhasūtra, and is in large part also contained in his Ratnagotravibhāga commentary.

In the present paper it will be shown how Zhang ston elaborates, on the basis of numerous passages from the Maitreya Works, the Avikalpapraveśadhāraṇī, the Anūnatvāpūrṇatvanirdeśa, and even other parts of the Laṅkāvatārasūtra itself, that one faces eight undesired consequences if one does not strictly differentiate buddha-nature from the ground consciousness. Zhang ston not only argues against a position that I could identify in ‘Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) Ratnagotravibhāga commentary, i.e., an exegetical system that regards buddha-nature and adventitious stains as not ontologically different, any more than ocean water and its waves are, but also the Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje’s (1284-1339) Yogācāra-based distinction between the ground consciousness and the pure mind (i.e., the equivalent of buddha-nature) that accepts within the basis of negation a dependently arising perfect nature.

Empty of True Existence, Yet Full of Qualities. Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880–1940) on Buddha Nature.

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:35:38 +0000

Without ever straying more than a few kilometres from the valleys of the ‘Dzam thang area of southern A mdo where he was born, a stronghold of the Jo nang tradition, Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho (1880–1940) had a very sedentary life. Still, he was exposed to a broad range of philosophical views through teachers, such as ‘Ba’ mda’ dGe legs (1844-1904) and Ngag dbang chos ‘byor (1846-1910), who also appreciated dGe lugs scholasticism and who had studied with some of the most prominent bKa’ brgyud and rNying ma authorities of the 19th century, such as Kong sprul (1813–1899), dPal sprul (1808–1887), and Mi pham (1846–1912). This paper examines how this broad range of views translated to Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho’s position on the polarizing topic of buddha-nature. On the basis of key passages from two of his major philosophical works, the Illuminating Light (Rab gsal snang) and Removing the Anguish of Holding to Extremes (mThar ‘dzin gdung ‘phrog), I will argue that he sought to harmonize the orthodox perspective of his own tradition on this subject with that, essentially opposite, of the dGe lugs pas. In line with the latter, Tshogs gnyis rgya mtsho presents buddha-nature as immanent in all sentient beings inasmuch as it is nothing but the mind’s emptiness of inherent existence that is determined through logical-analytical investigation. On the other hand, he does not depart from the fundamental view of Dol po pa (1292–1361) and elaborates on that same buddha-nature qua emptiness in positive terms. Accordingly, he maintains that, once it is directly realized in the meditative equipoise of the noble ones of Mahāyāna in which all adventitious stains are naturally exhausted, buddha-nature becomes manifests as primordially existent, replete with qualities, and transcending all conceptual elaborations.

Buddha Nature as Seen by Early Bka’ brgyud Masters

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:34:18 +0000

Sgam po pa (1079-1153), whose way of teaching had such an impact on his disciples that the traditions evolving from them were all summed up under the umbrella Dwags po Bka’ brgyud, is well known for his Precious Ornament of Liberation (Thar pa rin po che’i rgyan). He begins this Mahāyāna manual by emphasizing that the very basis for the spiritual process culminating in awakening is *sugatagarbha and proceeds to identify buddha-nature with emptiness. On a first glance this seems to resemble presentations of buddha-nature from a negating perspective. However, in a number of his other teachings recorded by his disciples and collected in his gSung ‘bum, he is very specific in his understanding of mind’s emptiness. In his “Excellent Qualities, Teachings to the Assembly” (Tshogs chos yon tan phun tshogs), he points out that mind is not mere essencelessness, but rather coemergent wisdom which he in turn equates with natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa), both key terms of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā. While Sgam po pa rather uses this terminology and hardly ever the term buddha-nature, La yag pa (12 c.), one of his immediate disciples, explicitly equates nonarising, coemergent wisdom, and natural awareness with buddha-nature imbued with inconceivable buddha qualities. A century later, during the time of the Third Karma pa (1284–1339), it had become standard that Bka’ brgyud masters equated natural awareness with buddha-nature endowed with qualities while simultaneously refraining from attributing any substantial quality to it. This paper’s intention is to take a closer look at the early masters and explore how their meditation-oriented approach is based in both affirming buddha-nature as the ground and goal of Buddhist soteriology and avoiding its reification into an entity with real properties.

The Difference Between a Sentient Being and a Buddha: ’Jig rten gsum mgon’s Instruction on the Process of Confusion

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:33:02 +0000

This paper will present the text Phyag chen ’khrul pa rtsad gcod ’khrul lugs ngos ’dzin gyi gdams pa (A Mahāmudrā Investigation into Confusion: An Instruction for Identifying the Process of Confusion) by ’Jig rten gsum mgon. This text explains what differentiates sentient beings from buddhas and how they are ultimately inseparable. The disciple Mkhan po Bzod pa asks his teacher to clarify where confusion comes from and which came first: a buddha or a sentient being. ’Jig rten gsum mgon answers that neither came first, that there is no difference in terms of time between the two, and that the first buddha is the primordial buddha (ādibuddha), which is the dharmatā (chos nyid), and the first sentient being is the dharmin (chos can). The dharmatā and dharmin is the basis of all (kun gzhi). He explains that the dharmatā exists within all sentient beings, and their confusion is caused by not recognizing that this dharmatā exists within them. Recognizing this dharmatā is to become a buddha according to ’Jig rten gsum mgon. This is a profound text that shows how sentient beings and buddhas are related, how confusion arises that leads to saṃsāra, and how recognition of the true nature of sentient beings is the way to enlightenment. We will discuss the major points of this text and how dharmatā is related to the idea of buddha-nature of the Uttaratantra.

Uttaratantraśāstra: A New French Translation from Tibetan According to ‘Jam mgon Kong sprul’s Commentary

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:32:14 +0000

Christian and Patrick have recently finished a new translation of ‘Jam mgon Kong sprul’s commentary on the Uttaratantrashastra into French, Traité de la Continuité suprême du Grand Véhicule, which will be available at the symposium. Christian and Patrick will share insights from their work on this new translation.
Christian and Patrick have recently finished a new translation of ‘Jam mgon Kong sprul’s commentary on the Uttaratantrashastra into French, Traité de la Continuité suprême du Grand Véhicule, which will be available at the symposium. Christian and Patrick will share insights from their work on this new translation.
Linguistically, our main challenge has been to keep a “classical” style with an “experiential” flavour and bridge the gap between flowery poetry and philosophical prose. As our choices indeed reflect our understanding of the treatise, this presentation will lead us to express our personal views of the contents.

Sentient Beings Within: Buddha-Nature and the Great Perfection

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:31:23 +0000

This paper describes the status of a sentient being in the buddha rather than how the buddha, or buddha-nature, exists in sentient beings. It focuses in particular on how buddha-nature is interpreted by Mi pham (1846-1912) in light of his tradition of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen). The qualities of a buddha, as present or not at the time of a sentient being, is an issue closely associated with Madhyamaka debates in Tibet around “other-emptiness” (gzhan stong) and “self-emptiness” (rang stong). A position that accepts that the qualities of the buddha are primordially present, unconditioned, and thus not newly produced, is closely connected to the affirmation of an “other-emptiness” view. While Mi pham accepts this position, he also qualifies his assertion by emphasizing the way that the buddha-nature is also empty, and by making a distinction between the way things are (in which all of the buddha’s qualities are primordially present), and the way things appear (in which the qualities of a buddha are newly produced). This paper considers the way his unique treatment of buddha-nature reflects his legacy of the Great Perfection.

Buddha-Nature and Selfhood

Gwen Witt Dorring — Fri, 13 Sep 2019 06:29:45 +0000

The eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s (1507–1554) prolific writings on tathāgatagarbha contain several extended disquisitions on the topic of how buddha-nature relates to different conceptions of selfhood. On the one hand, he broadly rejects, along the lines of standard Madhyamaka critiques of the belief in self (ātmagrāha), any equation between buddha-nature and a self. While his critiques take in the controversial current of early Indian buddha-nature theory that had equated buddha-nature with a true self, their primary target is ‘Gos Lo tsā ba gZhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) identification of buddha-nature with a subtle self, which was allegedly made under the tutelage of Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa’s (1357–1419) conception of a subtle self. On the other hand, the Karma pa does accept a conception of authentic selfhood or transcendent perfection of self (ātmapāramitā) advanced in certain Tathāgatagarbha and Buddhist tantric texts that is said to be realized precisely through understanding selflessness. A touchstone of his attempt to reconcile these two seemingly antithetical views on the relationship between buddha-nature and selfhood is to regard them as complementary rather than contradictory. On this view, the negation of self is regarded as an indispensable moment in the discovery of authentic selfhood, which is in this case synonymous with dharmakāya and resultant buddha-nature. This presentation will explore the broad range of Indian and Tibetan views on buddha-nature and selfhood considered by Mi bskyod rdo rje and show how he presented and defended his own tradition’s position in relation or reaction to these.